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I Introduction
Long ago, torts were simple. A defendant harmed a plaintiff. The plain-
tiff sought compensation. Ifthe defendant refused to pay, a court resolved the
dispute by applying the maxim of "he who breaks must pay.I1
* Professor of Law, Samford University, Cumberland School of Law. Thanks to Ellen
M. Bublick, Michael Green, Michael Heise, Paul LeBel, Jay Tidmarsh, Steve Ware, and George
Wright for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks also to Nicole
Rocco for her outstanding research assistance.
1. See W. PAGE KEETONET AL., PRossER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 75, at 534-35 (5th
ed. 1984) (stating that "'[i]n all civil acts,' it was said, 'the law doth not so much regard the
intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering"' so that "[t]here was, in other
words, a rule... that 'he who breaks must pay'") (footnote omitted) (quoting Lambert v.
Bessey, 83 Eng. Rep. 220 (1681)).
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But society became more complex, and tort law changed. The industrial
revolution, for example, ushered in a fault-based regime of "he who breaks
must pay" - if he failed to behave as a reasonably prudent person.2 Later, the
development of manufactured goods gave rise to strict products liability, or
"he who breaks must pay" - especially if he can bear and distribute the loss?
More recently, the emergence of "toxic torts" has forced courts again to
rethink existing doctrine.'
Toxic torts are cases involving injuries caused by exposure to environ-
mental toxins.' These cases, however, involve an inherent problem: Long
latency periods often precede exposure-related harm,' making it difficult for
2. See KEETONET AL., supra note 1, § 28, at 161 (describing origins of negligence in tort
law); Robert A. Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk;
Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 83, 110 (noting that "[s]ubsidizing
[industrial] development has been central to tort law throughout the century or more in which
the negligence standard has dominated... [tort] law"); cf Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the
Economy in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J 1717,1727 (1981)
(cautioning that "strict liability standards in traditional English law seem ambivalent and con-
fused," while negligence strands are "both more distinct and more capable of extended applica-
tion").
3. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,Inc., 377 P.2d 897,901 (Cal. 1963) (stating that
purpose of strict liability "is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965) ("One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer.., is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer.., although.., the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product .... ).
4. See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing existing causation doctrine
in toxic tort context).
5. The term "toxic torts" is also broad enough to encompass cases involving injuries
caused by the toxicity of products or manufacturing processes. See GERALD W. BOSTON & M.
STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORTS 3 (1994) (asserting that
"[e]nvironmental and toxic torts comprise harms to person, to property, or to the environment
due to the toxicity of a product, a substance, or a process" (footnote omitted)); Troyen A.
Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1993) (referring generally to such
claims as "environmental torts"). Plaintiffs premise toxic tort claims, however, on traditional
tort theories. See Keith J. Klein, Fear of Cancer -A Legitimate Claim in Toxic Tort Cases?,
33 A.F. L. REV. 193, 194 (1990) (arguing that "[t]he phrase 'toxic torts' is misleading to the
extent that it implies any new cause of action for wrongs that occur when people are exposed
to hazardous substances released into the environment [because t]oxic torts are based on the
same three general theories of liability that underlie the rest of tort law: intentional interference
with plaintiff's person or property, negligence, and strict liability" (footnotes omitted)). The
difficulty in these cases, therefore, concerns applying traditional tort law concepts to difficult
and previously unforeseen circumstances.
6. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 21 (stating that "[tihe latency period that characterizes
many environmental illnesses can be as long as twenty years"); infra notes 23-29 and accompa-
nying text (describing difficulties created by long latency periods).
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plaintiffs to connect current illness to any specific exposure!
Recently, some plaintiffs have worked around the latency problem by
filing suit before they become sick.8 Courts have recognized "pre-manifesta-
tion" claims in three different contexts. First, courts have sustained actions
for fear of disease, in which plaintiffs seek compensation for the invasion of
their mental well-being.' Second, courts have recognized claims for medical
monitoring, in which plaintiffs seek recovery for the cost of medical surveil-
lance to detect the onset of disease."0 At "the top of the pyramid," however,
are cases in which plaintiffs seek recovery for the very fact of living with an
enhanced risk of disease."
7. See Tamsen Douglas Love, Note, Deterring Irresponsible Use and Disposal of Toxic
Substances: The Case for Legislative Recognition of Increased Risk Causes of Action, 49
VAND. L. REv. 789, 803 (1996) (noting that "long latency periods also contribute to what is
arguably the most problematic issue in toxic tort litigation - proving causation"); infra notes
117-30 and accompanying text (explaining difficulty in proving causation). The difficulty also
can cause problems for toxic tort plaintiffs because of the risks that statute of limitations periods
will run and that potential defendants will no longer exist or will be insolvent. See Love, supra,
at 802-03 (stating that long latency periods create barriers to recovery); see also Brennan, supra
note 5, at 54 (noting that "the diseases that follow toxic exposures .. . typically have latency
periods between the original exposure and the ultimate manifestation of the disease, the latter
being the time when the victim realizes the need to seek redress for the harm done" and con-
cluding that "[w]ithout some qualifications to the conventional understanding of 'accrual,' the
vast majority of environmental injury claims could never even be filed").
8. Latent harm cases involving claims for post-manifestation recovery have given rise
to some of the most troubling chapters in twentieth century tort law, such as DES and asbestos
litigation. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(permitting liability to be imposed on asbestos manufacturers); Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d
924 (Cal. 1980) (permitting liability to be imposed on producers of DES); Fischer v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986) (permitting punitive damages against asbestos manu-
facturers). It is only more recently that courts have faced an increasing number of claims in the
pre-manifestation context. See Note, Latent Harms and Risk-Based Damages, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1505, 1507 (1998) [hereinafter Note, Latent Harms].
9. See, e.g., Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993); Dartez v. Fibre-
board Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp., 943
S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App. 1997), rev'd, 993 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1999); Glen Donath, Curing Cancer
Phobia: Reasonableness Redefined, 62 U. CIL L. REV. 1113 (1995) (outlining state of cancer
phobia law and suggesting rule for recovery); cf. Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (deciding that plaintiff may not recover for enhanced risk of contract-
ing cancer).
10. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993); Ayers
v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,
858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993). See generally Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking Medical Monitoring,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Klein, MedicalMonitoring].
11. See Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claimsfor Damages From Toxic
Exposure Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENvTL. L. 285, 349 (1994) ("The en-
hanced risk cause of action is at the top of the pyramid from the plaintiff's perspective because
it involves the greatest amount of money.... But, because the cause of action rests on the mere
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Courts have not favored enhanced risk claims, and have placed significant
barriers in front ofthose who have filed such actions.'2 Several commentators
have suggested ways in which courts might remove these barriers. 3 However,
no proposal has convinced courts that the tort system can adequately address
enhanced risk recovery. This Article represents an effort to do so.
14
The Article begins by describing the hurdles that enhanced risk plaintiffs
face under existing doctrine. These hurdles prevent tort law from sufficiently
deterring those who create risk by exposing others to environmental toxins.' 5
The Article then reviews proposals that seek to remedy this problem. In
particular, the Article focuses on proposals that would award proportional
recovery based on plaintiffs' level of increased risk. 6 These proposals have
strong appeal from a deterrence perspective. The Article asserts, however,
that they are not sufficiently attentive to the role that corrective justice plays
potential to develop the disease, a plaintiff seeking damages for increased risk also faces the
highest barriers to recovery."); see also Love, supra note 7, at 809 (concluding that "[i]ncreased
risk is the most difficult [pre-manifestation] claim on which to succeed").
12. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text (discussing enhanced risk doctrine).
Only two appellate courts, both in asbestos cases, appear to have upheld enhanced risk awards.
See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986); Gideon v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985). In non-asbestos cases, plaintiffs uni-
formly have been unable to satisfy the standard of proof. See Deirdre A. McDonnell, Comment,
Increased Risk of Disease Damages: Proportional Recovery as an Alternative to the All or
NothingSystem Exemplified byAsbestos Cases, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 623,640 (1997).
13. See, e.g., David P. C. Ashton, Comment, Decreasing the Risks Inherent in Claimsfor
Increased Risk of Future Disease, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1081 (1989) (suggesting ways to
improve handling of enhanced risk claims); Brent Carson, Comment, Increased Risk ofDisease
from Hazardous Waste: Proposalfor Judicial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1985) (same);
Keith W. Lapeze, Comment, Recovery for Increased Risk of Disease in Louisiana, 58 LA. L.
REV. 249 (1997) (examining problems of existing Louisiana law and suggesting solutions for
enhanced risk recovery); Note, Latent Harms, supra note 8 (suggesting solution to problem of
latent harms); Barton C. Legum, Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18
GA. L. REV. 563 (1984) (analyzing barriers to recovery for enhanced risk of cancer); Love,
supra note 7 (suggesting special rules to address problems of enhanced risk recovery); Mc-
Donnell, supra note 12 (suggesting proportional system of compensation for latent harms). But
see John C. Cummings, Comment, How Far Should Increased RiskRecovery Be Carried in the
Context of Exposure to Hazardous Substances?, 76 KY. L. J. 459,478 (1987-88) (concluding
that manifest injury should be prerequisite to tort recovery).
14. In addition, the Article builds upon a standard set forth by this author in a recent
article that proposes a standard for medical monitoring in pre-manifestation toxic tort cases.
See generally Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10.
15. See infra notes 43-45, 53-54 and accompanying text (explaining that current tort law
approaches fal to sufficiently deter risky conduct).
16. "Proportional liability" advocates suggest that courts award plaintiffs the present value
of risk. The value would be "equal to the present value of future losses multiplied by the esti-
mated probability of their occurrence." Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Com-
pensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 787 (1985); see infra notes 55-72 and
accompanying text (describing proportional liability model).
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in tort law,17 nor do they sufficiently deal with the issue of administrative
feasibility.
18
The Article then sets forth a new standard: Tort law should permit
enhanced risk recovery on a proportional basis, but only when a plaintiff can
prove that the toxic exposure has more than doubled her risk of contracting
disease in the futlre.19 The Article justifies this standard as logically consis-
tent with toxic tort doctrine in other settings2" and as cognizant ofthe need for
tort law to deter risky conduct. However, the standard also is attuned to the
role that corrective justice should play in establishing tort law doctrine.21 The
Article concludes by providing several examples of how the new standard
realistically could work, both on its own and in conjunction with other causes
of action.22 In the end, the Article suggests that the proposed standard repre-
sents a step forward in tort law's efforts to resolve toxic tort claims.
ff. Traditional Doctrine
A. Overview
Courts have struggled with enhanced risk claims, in part because these
claims do not fit neatly into existing tort paradigms.' Assume, for example,
17. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanyingtexL
19. See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
20. In particular, this standard would link enhanced risk recovery to standards that courts
apply in post-manifestation toxic tort cases. See infra notes 118-33 and accompanying text.
21. In this way, the Article proposes a solution that is attentive to the competing tension
between corrective justice and utilitarianism that pervades so many of the debates in tort law
scholarship. See Gary T. Schwartz,MixedTheoriesofTortLaw: AffirmingBoth Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) ("Currently there are two major camps
of tort scholars. One understands tort liability as an instrument aimed largely at the goal of
deterrence, commonly explained within the framework of economics. The other looks at tort law
as away of achieving corrective justice between the parties."); see also infra notes 91-100, 134-
36 and accompanying text (discussing gap between deterrence and corrective justice scholars).
22. See inffra notes 146-87 and accompanying text.
23. See Love, supra note 7, at 805 (noting that "[c]ourts typically try to force these
[enhanced risk] causes of action into the traditional tort paradigm, with the result that plaintiffs
are faced with difficult and often insurmountable barriers to recovery"). Such "paradigms" might
be viewed as revolving around physical, emotional, or economic harm. In enhanced risk cases,
however, the plaintiffs injury simply cannot be so easily compartmentalized. This problem
might be surmountable by applying the Restatement of Torts's broad definition of injury as the
invasion of any "legally protected interest" to argue that enhanced risk is something compensable
in and ofitself. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924 (1965) (defining injury as invasion
of any "legally protected interest"); Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using
Common Sense and the Common Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental
Hazards, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 273 (1988) (stating that "'the entire history of the
development of tort law shows a continuous tendency to recognize as worthy of legal protection
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that X negligently has introduced a toxic substance into Z's drinking water
supply. Z does not exhibit any symptoms of disease, nor does she suffer from
emotional distress because of a fear of future disease. But scientific evidence
shows that the exposure has increased Z's risk of contracting cancer in the
future.24
If Z sues Xfor increasing Z's risk of disease, however, her claim will not
fit into any traditional tort law "compartment." For example, because Z does
not seek recovery for current injury, she would not be likely to maintain a negli-
gence claim.' Similarly, Z's claim for emotional distress would not be success-
ful because she would not be seeking recovery for harm to her psyche. Finally,
Z is not seeking recovery for any economic or dignitary damage. Therefore,
specialized claims, like those for medical monitoring, would not be helpful.26
Yet a sense remains that X has wronged Z by increasing her future risk
of disease.Y Does Z have to wait until she becomes ill before she can sue X.
28
Or can the tort system address the problem now?29 A number of courts have
struggled with this very question.
interests which were previously not protected at all"' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 1 emt. d (1965))). However, doing so still leaves courts with the difficult task of
assessing and valuing enhanced risk apart from more established categories of harm. Cf Love,
supra note 7, at 814 (discussing how to establish existence of "injury" in enhanced risk actions).
24. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text (discussing use of scientific evidence
to prove causation).
25. See KEETONET AL., supra note 1, § 30, at 165 (stating that damages are part of prima
facie negligence case); see also Richardson v. Michigan Humane Soc'y, 561 N.W.2d 873, 874
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (same). Damages also are required in strict liability and nuisance
actions. See, e.g., Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1998)
(requiring damages in strict liability actions); Tipler v. McKenzie Tank Lines, 547 So.2d 438,
440 (Ala. 1989) (requiring damages in nuisance actions). Such actions also might form the
basis for Z's claim againstX. See Joseph H. King, Jr., 'Reduction ofLikelihood"Reformulation
and OtherRetrofitting oftheLoss-of-a-ChanceDoct'ne, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491,499 (1998)
[hereinafter King, Reduction ofLikelihood] (discussing strict liability and nuisance actions).
26. See infra note 112 (discussing medical monitoring claims); supra note 10 and accom-
panying text (same).
27. In addition, the defendant, X, is not forced to internalize the damage that its conduct
ultimately will cause. See infra notes 43-45, 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing failure
of tort system to deter those who expose others to toxins).
28. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (explaining how delays raise problems
associated with statutes of limitation and single action rule).
29. To address the problem now, it is imperative to set aside what enhanced risk is not, and
focus on what is left- the current possibility of future physical harm. The "physical" in future
physical harm is not troubling. Indeed, courts have a great deal of experience in addressing
physical harm. The trick is dealing with the "possibility of future" harm. In this regard, courts
have struggled. More particularly, by refusing to rethink existing compartments of doctrine,
courts continually insist on asking whether a plaintiff has current physical harm in deciding
whether the defendant should compensate the plaintiff for the risk of contracting disease in the
future. The result is unsatisfactory. See infra notes 41-45, 51-54 and accompanying text.
ENHANCED RISK
B. Current Approach
Courts that have attempted to resolve claims like the one described above
have set forth a two-part hurdle for plaintiffs to clear. First, enhanced risk
plaintiffs must demonstrate the existence of some present injury attributable
to the toxic exposure.3" Second, enhanced risk plaintiffs must demonstrate that
they more likely than not will develop the latent disease for which the exposure
has increased their risk. 1 An examination of this standard, however, shows
that it represents a nearly insurmountable barrier for enhanced risk plaintiffs.
It also shows that the standard does not serve tort law's underlying goals.
As noted above, the first part of the current enhanced risk standard
requires that a plaintiff demonstrate the existence of current physical harm
related to his exposure. Typical of this focus is the court's opinion in
Amendola v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co32 In Amendola, nineteen
railroad employees brought an action under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (F.E.L.A.) to recover for increased susceptibility to disease because of
their workplace exposure to asbestos.33 The plaintiffs, however, did not allege
that they currently "sustained or manifested" any physical symptoms as a
result of the exposure.34 This failure, according to the court, was fatal to the
claims. The court explained:
If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient to give rise to [a] F.E.L.A.
cause of action, couitless seeminglyhealthy railroad workers, workers who
might never manifest injury, would have tort claims cognizable in federal
court. It is obvious that proof of damages in such cases would be highly
speculative, likely resulting in windfalls for those who never take ill and
insufficient compensation forthose who do. Requiring manifest injury as
a necessary element of an asbestos related tort action avoidsthese problems
and best serves the underlying purpose of tort law: The compensation of
victims who have suffered.
35
30. See Janet H. Smith, Increasing Fear of Future Injury Claims: Where Speculation
Carries theDay, 64 DF. CouNs. J. 547,552-53 (1997); McDonnell, supra note 12, at 624. This
requirement stems from non-toxic tort cases, such as Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d
675 (Or. 1975). InFeist, a cash register fell and fractured a child's skull. The plaintiff presented
evidence that the skull injury made the child more susceptible to contracting meningitis in the
future. The court held that it was proper for the jury to "consider 'the evidence that plaintiff has
susceptibility for such a future problem.'" Thus, the Feist court followed the traditional rule that
a "'plaintiff is entitled to compensation for all damages that reasonably are to be expected to
follow.., the [present] injury."' McDonnell, supra note 12, at 628 (citation omitted).
31. See McDonnell, supra note 12, at 628.
32. 699 F. Supp. 1401 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
33. Amendola v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 699 F. Supp. 1401, 1402 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
34. Id. at 1402-03 n.1.
35. Id. at 1407 (quoting Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.
1985)).
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Obviously, a literal application of a "manifest injury" standard would
preclude any pre-manifestation plaintiff in a toxic tort case from maintaining
a claim. It is not surprising, therefore, that plaintiffs have made creative argu-
ments regarding what constitutes a "manifest injury." For example, plaintiffs
in two asbestos cases that predate Amendola worked around the hurdle by
describing the inhalation of the asbestos fibers as a present physical harm.36
Plaintiffs have made similar arguments in cases involving other toxic sub-
stances, pointing to cellular or even "sub-cellular" damage as manifest harm. 7
But in such cases, plaintiffs run straight into the second part ofthe standard -
the requirement that they must prove to a degree of reasonable medical
certainty that the cancer will manifest in the future.38 Needless to say, devel-
36. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 412 (5th Cir. 1986)
(describing inhalation of asbestos fibers as present physical harm); Gideon v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129,1145 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); see also Carson, supra note 13, at 642
("Acceptance of cellular damage as a present cause of action will enable plaintiffs to receive
compensation for the full extent of the injury."). One commentator viewed this development
in the asbestos setting as representing part of a'liberalizing trend in the need for a current
physical injury in enhanced risk cases. See Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment, Enhanced
Risk ofDisease Claims: LimitingRecovery to Compensation forLoss, Not Chance, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 453,461-63 (1994). Initially, the commentator noted that in cases with "a severe concom-
itant physical injury, such as a head trauma or a fractured bone, many courts allow the jury to
consider evidence of enhanced risk of disease as going to the extent and permanency of the
harm." Id. at 461. This phenomenon, of course, is little more than application of the traditional
rule that permits for the award of future medical expenses, prominently applied in Feist v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675 (Or. 1975). The asbestos cases, however, expand this notion by
adopting "the view that subcellular or cellular damage can constitute injury." Thompson, supra,
at 462. The next, and most troubling, level of case would consider damage awards for "en-
hanced risk itself as the present injury." Id. at 463.
37. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205-06 n.23 (6th Cir.
1988); Love, supra note 7, at 807 (discussing Sterling).
38. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1986)
(concluding that "[p]laintiff who does not presently have cancer can state a claim or recover
damages in an action based upon strict liability in tort for the reasonable medical probability of
contracting cancer in the future"); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129,1137-
38 (5th Cir. 1985) (deciding that "[p]ossibility alone cannot serve as the basis for recovery, for
mere possibility does not meet the preponderance of the evidence standard" and that "[c]er-
tainty, however, is not required: the plaintiff need demonstrate only that the event is more likely
to occur than not" (footnote omitted)). Even before the mid-1980s asbestos cases were decided,
Professor Joseph H. King, Jr. wrote that there was
no recovery for future consequences or losses under the traditional rule, unless it
appears more likely than not that such a consequence or loss will occur that will be
attributable to the tortious conduct. In other words, it would have to appear that the
defendant destroyed a better-than-even chance of avoiding a future condition by
reducing by 51% the likelihood of avoiding it.
Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
PreexistingConditions andFuture Consequences, 90 YALEL.J. 1353,1372 (1981) [hereinafter
King, Preexisting Conditions] (footnote omitted). In more recent cases, the standard has been
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oping such evidence is a daunting task for most enhanced risk plaintiffs.39
And even where developing the evidence itself is possible, the standard
eliminates the possibility of bringing an action in many cases where the level
of increased risk is significant."
The obvious answer to this problem is that plaintiffs who fail to clear the
hurdles set before them should wait to sue when their disease manifests. But
this solution throws additional hurdles into the plaintiffs' paths. For example,
in latent harm cases, statutes of limitation and the "single cause of action
rule"41 might bar plaintiffs' claims by the time their disease manifests. As one
commentator recently explained, these rules often create a Catch-22:
If a plaintiff waits until he develops a disease to sue, he or she may lose all of
his or her causes ofactionbecause a traumatic event or other injury may have
expressed in a variety of fashions. See Smith, supra note 30, at 553 (stating that "[w]hile the
language differs from court to court, in order to recover, plaintiffs generally must establish that
there is a greater than 50 percent chance that the disease or condition will occur" and noting that
"[t]he standard of proof has been variously described as: more probable than not; reasonably
certain; reasonably probable; medically probable; a probability, or a reasonable medical
certainty" (footnotes omitted)); see also Legum, supra note 13, at 568 (discussing how "[c-
]ourts, implicitly recognizing that the injury they are compensating is actually the risk of future
injury, allow the jury to assess potential damages only when the evidence introduced indicates
that there is at least a probability that such damages will occur" (footnote omitted)).
39. See generally Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Co., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). Sterling,
a commonly-cited example outside the asbestos setting, involved a class action brought by
individuals who lived near the defendant's chemical waste site. The Sterling court rejected the
plaintiffs' increased risk claims, which were based on expert testimony that representative
plaintiffs' susceptibility to cancer and other diseases increased from 25% to 30%. Id. at 1205.
Applying Tennessee law, the court stated that the plaintiffs failed to provide proof to a reason-
able medical certainty that the disease would manifest. Id. According to the court, the "mere
increased risk of a future disease or condition resulting from an initial injury is not compensa-
ble." Id. at 1204. For discussion of Sterling, see Lapeze, supra note 13, at 255 and McDonnell,
supra note 12, at 640.
40. For example, imagine a situation where the toxic exposure increased the risk of a
particular disease from 1% to 49%. Current doctrine would bar such a plaintiff from maintain-
ing an enhanced risk action under current doctrine because he could not demonstrate a likeli-
hood that his disease actually would manifest in the future.
41. One commentator explained the single action rule as follows:
Grounded in the doctrine of res judicata, the single cause of action rule, also called
claim preclusion, provides that a single wrongful act can give rise to only one action.
When a plaintiff fails to include an item of damage or a ground of recovery in a single
cause of action, he or she may not claim the omitted element later. If a plaintiff
prevails on a cause of action, any other potential claims merge into that judgment.
McDonnell, supra note 12, at 630-31 (footnotes omitted); see Wells, supra note 11, at 323-24
(stating that "[tihe necessity for the development of the doctrine of enhanced risk derives from
the single action rule" and that "[t]he traditional rule requires the plaintiff to bring all of his
complaints against the defendant regarding a single incident to the court at one time" (footnote
omitted)).
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occurred during exposure that triggered prescription. However, because the
plaintiffmay only sue once for the same transaction or occurrence, if he or she
sues withinthe prescriptive period forthe incidental damages due to exposure,
res judicata will bar a subsequent suit for a disease.'
Such a situation raises a serious theoretical concern - the defendant that
caused the exposure is never forced to internalize 'the full costs of its
activity.43 In fact, in the typical toxic tort case in which exposure-related harm
is latent,44 the defendant may never internalize any of the long-term health
costs associated with its activity. Thus, a tort system that does not address
enhanced risk claims shortly after exposure may fall far short of providing
optimal deterrence against those that expose others to toxins."5
C. Patchwork Solutions
Many people have suggested patchwork solutions to these problems,
largely by suggesting that courts loosen limitations and single action barriers.
With respect to statutes of limitations, some have urged aggressive implemen-
tation of the discovery rule, whereby limitations periods would not begin to
run until the plaintiff learned, or should have learned, of her injury.4" With
respect to the single cause of action rule, -some have suggested permitting
plaintiffs to split their cause of action, allowing plaintiffs to sue for enhanced
risk now and manifest disease later.47
42. Lapeze, supra note 13, at 257; see Wells, supra note 11, at 326 (noting that "the
potential plaintiff is faced with a choice between an inadequate recovery if he sues immediately,
and no recovery if he waits").
43. The situation may give rise to corrective justice concerns as well, in that the defendant
is never held accountable for the harm that it caused to other individuals. See infra notes 80-
100, 132-35 and accompanying text (providing further discussion of relationship between
enhanced risk and corrective justice).
44. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing latency problem).
45. See King, Preexisting Conditions, supra note 38, at 1377 (asserting that this all-or-
nothing approach "subverts the deterrence objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the
effects of conduct that causes statistically demonstrable losses"); McDonnell, supra note 12, at
626 (discussing deterrence).
46. See Lapeze, supra note 13, at 258 (advocating discovery rule as solution to statute of
limitations problems); see also Thompson, supra note 36, at 469 (noting that "the trend among
courts is to depart from the traditional rule and follow the discovery rule instead").
47. See Lapeze, supra note 13, at 259 (positing that "splitting the cause of action will not
force the plaintiff to choose between suing right away on incidental causes of action and losing
the cancer claim due to claim preclusion, or waiting until the disease develops and most likely
being barred due to prescription"); see also W. Neil Evans, Providing Adequate Remedies to
Toxic Tort Victims, TRIAL, Apr. 1997, at 56, 56 (arguing that splitting cause of action is
preferable to claim preclusion); Thompson, supra note 36, at 472 (stating that "[a] growing
minority of states allow[s] the plaintiff to split the cause of action and sue for each successive
disease as it develops" (footnote omitted)).
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These solutions, however, raise more problems than they solve. For
example, even with a discovery rule, determining the date of accrual for
purposes of the statute of limitations is not easy. Is it the date of exposure?
The date of "sub-cellular injury"? The date when the plaintiff discovers the
defendant's legal responsibility? Or do we wait until manifestation of disease
before starting the clock?48 In addition, applying the discovery rule, particu-
larly with a later accrual date, raises the very problems that limitations periods
are meant to avoid in the first place, such as the possibility of stale evidence,
uncertainty,49 and perhaps even insolvent defendants.5 ° Likewise, splitting the
cause of action destroys the basic principles of res judicata because it makes
great sacrifices in terms of certainty and efficiency.
In sum, enhanced risk claims suffer from a dissatisfying gridlock. The
prevailing test includes a current "injury" component that is artificial at best
and illogical at worst.5" The test also includes a burden of proof concerning
future manifestation that is virtually impossible for plaintiffs to meet.52 Yet,
waiting for manifestation itself is highly problematic. 3 The result is that
enhanced risk of disease remains virtually ignored in the tort system. This is
troubling, however, in an environment in which we know that actors will cause
harm, yet the tort system is failing to address or to deter their risky activities.
54
48. See Thompson, supra note 36, at 468 (determining that date of accrual might "contrib-
ute to the confusion in cases involving enhanced risk of disease and often will influence results").
49. See, e.g., Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 176-77 (N.H. 1977) (analyzing
discovery rule).
50. In addition, waiting until manifestation decreases the chance that a defendant will be
solvent and able to pay a damage award. See Love, supra note 7, at 802-03 (noting that "by the
time a disease manifests itself, a particular company may have reorganized, gone out of
business, or declared bankruptcy" and recognizing that "[t]here is no guarantee, for instance,
that a paper mill which releases dioxin into a nearby stream will still be operating twenty-five
years later when people who swam in the stream actually contract cancer" (footnotes omitted)).
51. See supra notes 29, 41-45 and accompanying text (explaining problems attendant to
application of prevailing test); see also E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemo-
phobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REV.
781,789 (1988) [hereinafter Elliott, TheFuture of Toxic Torts] (arguing that "[w]e should purge
toxic tort law of the unfortunate and legally anomalous doctrine that no harm is suffered unless
the plaintiff can prove that it is more likely than not that involuntary exposure to the chemical
caused a recognized disease or other form of physical harm" and that "[this] violation of a
person's bodily autonomy... is also an injury that the law should recognize and compensate").
52. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text (describing burden of proof problems
under prevailing test).
53. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (describing statute of limitation and res
judicata problems in enhanced risk cases).
54. This problem is only likely to increase as more toxins are released into the environ-
ment and as people become more aware of their risks. See infra notes 105-10 and accompany-
ing text; cf. Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts, supra note 51, at 785 (speculating that press
coverage of toxic tort cases might inflate public concern over health risks).
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111. The Proportional Liability Model
As the previous paragraph suggests, the lack of tort law action in the
enhanced risk arena leads to a concern about under-deterrence. In other
words, entities are engaging in activities that undoubtedly lead to costs in
terms of human health, but the law may not force these entities to internalize
the full costs of their activities." With this fact in mind, it is not surprising
that those who have proposed changes to tort law's current approach to
enhanced risk have done so largely from a utilitarian perspective - that is,
with an eye toward creating a system that provides optimal deterrence.5" This
section of the Article sets out the utilitarian solution to the enhanced risk
problem - a solution that focuses on proportionalizing liability 7 for enhanced
risk at the time of exposure, rather than on compensating for physical injury
at the time of manifestation. This section also addresses three major objec-
tions to this approach: first, the notion that proportional liability will
undercompensate those who eventually do become ill (or will overcompensate
those who do not); second, the notion that proportional liability gives
insufficient attention to corrective justice as an underlying basis for tort law
rules;59 and third, the argument that a proportional recovery model would not
be administratively feasible.' From that perspective, this Article proposes a
solution that incorporates the utilitarians' concerns and the corrective justice
view, as well as practical considerations of administrative feasibility.1
A. The Basics ofProportional Liability
The theory of proportional liability in an enhanced risk case is straight-
forward. Professor Glen Robinson, an early and strong proponent of propor-
tional liability, explained the concept:
Assuming that the risk [from exposure] is one that would give rise to
liability when the actual loss is suffered, why not adjudicate the entire case
55. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
56. See Legum, supra note 13, at 583 ("If producers and handlers of carcinogens are
forced to pay for the costs of the cancer caused by negligent or defective production or negligent
handling, they will have incentive to engage in the socially optimal level of production or care
in handling."). This concern is not irrelevant even to those who view corrective justice as the
dominant goal of tort law. As Professor Schwartz pointed out, a number of prominent commen-
tators and attorneys who are not regarded as economists have supported deterrence as a rationale
for tort law. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1829.
57. See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text
60. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 111-46 and accompanying text.
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by awarding the victim the present value of the risk at the point at which
the risk can be identified and given some measurable value? The value is
equal to the present value of the future losses multiplied by the estimated
probability of their occurrence.62
For example, suppose that BigCo negligently has exposed one thousand
persons to a toxin that has increased the risk of cancer for each population
member from 10% to 30%. Under current doctrine, BigCo would not have to
deal with the consequence of its conduct until someone actually contracts
cancer and attempts to associate it with the exposure. 3 Under a system of
proportional liability, however, each member of the population would have
the right to sue immediately for 20% of the damages associated with a future
cancer case.' Those concerned with deterrence cheer this result - the tort
system forces defendants to internalize the future costs of their behavior now,
but does not force them to overcompensate the exposed plaintiffs as a class.65
In further support of their views, proportional liability advocates point to
its better-established cousin in American tort law: proportional recovery for
the lost chance of survival.' As Professor Robinson explained,
62. Robinson, supra note 16, at 786; see King, Preexisting Conditions, supra note 38, at
1387 (supporting compensation by method that reflects probability).
63. See Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10, at 19-23 (discussing difficulties that
plaintiffs face in proving causation in toxic tort cases); infra notes 117-30 and accompanying
text (same).
64. See2ENTRPRisEREsPoNSmUBrYIFoRPERSONALINJURY369-75 (1991) (advocating
proportional liability if attributable fraction of disease at particular level of exposure is between
20% and 80%). Professor Robinson is clear that this should be a plaintiff's choice, not a
requirement
It is enough in any case to say that I do not propose to require victims to pursue
recovery for risk if they prefer to await the outcome and seek compensation for
actual injury. The question is whether there is reason to deny an action to a risk
victim who does not want to wait, say, a decade to find out whether injury ensues.
Robinson, supra note 16, at 788 (emphasis in original). Professor Robinson also is clear that
he is not advocating a change in the rules for defining what activities are tortious; rather, he is
advocating a re-definition of what constitutes a compensable injury. Id. at 782-83. For a
slightly more sophisticated method for calculating damages using a proportional liability
scheme, see infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
65. See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210,234 (1996) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Individual
Justice] (asserting that risk-based insurance fund claims or proportional liability "may serve a
special deterrence role in mass-exposure cases ... by preventing firms from using latency
periods to become judgment-proof or otherwise evade the bulk of claims"); McDonnell, supra
note 12, at 647 (stating that proportional liability "would provide a deterrent to negligent
behavior that creates an increased risk of disease, but would avoid over-compensating plaintiffs
as a class").
66. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983)
(permitting recovery for lost chance of survival); see also Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474,
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[t]ortious exposure to risk is in fact really the obverse of these "loss of
chance" cases, and the problems of causal determination and valuation are
virtually identical. To the extent courts now recognize compensation for
the value ofthe loss of a chance, they could equally recognize tortious risk
exposure. 67
Professor Joseph King, an early advocate of proportional liability in the lost
chance setting, addressed this very point.s In his oft-cited work, Professor
King detailed two ways to value enhanced risk, even when the plaintiff cannot
prove that there is a probability of the harm manifesting itself in the future.69
First, Professor King suggested that courts could use a "single outcome"
approach, in which expert testimony would estimate the odds and most likely
date of the onset of disease and calculate damages accordingly."0 Alterna-
tively, Professor King suggested that courts could use a more complicated, but
more precise, test involving the calculation of "expected value" or "weighted
means" based on a variety of estimates concerning the possible odds and time
484 (Conn. 1990) (same); United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 78 (Del. 1995) (same);
Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 183 (Kan. 1994) (same); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398,400
(N.J. 1990) (same); Carson, supra note 13, at 646 (noting that loss of chance doctrine supports
recovery for increased risk victims); Love, supra note 7, at 818-19 (noting analytical similarities
between loss of chance and increased risk cases). Another commentator described the relation-
ship between lost chance of survival and increased risk of disease actions as follows:
In both a lost chance of survival action and an increased risk of disease action, the
damage is the chance that a future event will occur. In a lost chance claim, the
event is survival; in an increased risk claim, the event is developing a disease.
Therefore, the damages should be based on how much the chance has increased or
decreased, not the ultimate harm that might be caused by the negligence. This is
because the interest that is being protected in both cases is the freedom from the
increased or decreased risk or chance.
Lapeze, supra note 13, at 267.
67. Robinson, supra note 16, at 793.
68. See King, Preexisting Conditions, supra note 38, at 1354 ("It is the thesis of this
article that the loss of a chance of achieving a favorable outcome or of avoiding an adverse
consequence should be compensable and should be valued appropriately, rather than treated as
an all-or-nothing proposition.").
69. See id. at 1383-85.
70. See id. at 1383. Professor King provided the following example:
Consider its application to a tortious accident to a twenty-year old plaintiff that
creates a chance that blindness will result in the future .... Assume that if blind-
ness does result in the future, the most likely age of onset for this particular plaintiff
would be age fifty. Assume further that if blindness does occur at fifty, the loss at-
tributable to that condition would be $100,000. Because, however, it is not certain
that the injury will result in blindness, it would not be appropriate to award the full
$100,000. If the probability that the injury will result in blindness at any time is
30%, one might value the chance at $30,000.
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of the onset of disease." Either method does a better job of forcing actors to
internalize the true costs of their activities than does the traditional "all-or-
nothing" method. And a court easily could apply either method to an en-
hanced risk claim. 2
B. The Limits of Proportional Liability
Proportional liability, however, is subject-to some criticism. First, critics
assert that proportional liability is inherently unfair because it either overcom-
pensates or undercompensates victims. 73 As one commentator argued, "[t]o
the individual hazardous waste victim, [proportional liability] is either grossly
71. See id. at 1384-85. Professor King continued his example to explain this concept
Elaborating on the preceding example, assume, in an admittedly oversimplified set
of facts, that as a result of the accident there is a 25% chance of the onset of injury-
induced blindness occurring at fifty years of age, a 4% chance at forty, a 1% chance
at thirty, and a 70% chance that such blindness would never result. Assume further
that these are the only possible outcomes. Finally, assume that if blindness occurs
at age fifty the loss would be $100,000; if at age forty, $200,000; and if at age thirty
$300,000. Under the expected-value approach, the chance would be valued by
aggregating the possible outcomes discounted to reflect their degree of likelihood.
Thus, we would add $25,000 (25% of $100,000), $8,000 (4% of $200,000), $3,000
(1% of $300,000), and $0 (70% of $0), giving a total value of the chance of injury-
induced blindness of $36,000.
Id.
72. Professor King recently has authored an article in which he refined his views on the
loss of chance doctrine in light of the seventeen years that have elapsed since the publication
of his initial article. See King, Reduction of Likelihood, supra note 25, at 496. In this article,
Professor King acknowledged that the "loss-of-a-chance question sometimes arises in the
context of allegations that the defendant's negligence increased the risk or likelihood of future
harm." Id. at 509. In the introduction to the article, Professor King suggested that he would not
approve of such a cause of action. Id. at 496 ("Where the defendant's tortious conduct created
a risk of future consequences, the operation of the loss-of-chance doctrine should be suspended
until the harmful effects actually materialize."). He later acknowledged, however, that a full
evaluation of the enhanced risk issue was "beyond the scope of [his] Article." Id. at 511.
Ultimately, Professor King proposed a refined standard for the application of the loss-of-a-
chance doctrine that would help courts apply the concept even in situations where there is no
evidence of a "literal chance of survival." Id. at 559. Among the factors that Professor King
would take into account is an evaluation of whether the "defendant's tortious conduct was the
reason it was not feasible to determine precisely whether or not the more favorable outcome
would have materialized but for the tortious conduct" Id. at 495; see also id. at 542-43, 559-60
(listing other factors to consider in determining loss of chance). Professor King's proposals
would have primary application in the most common fact settings in which the principles are
applied, such as medical malpractice claims arising from delays in diagnoses of a patient's
illness. See id. at 547.
73. See Cummings, supra note 13, at 473 (stating that "[t]heoretically under the extent
of the injury approach, victims of toxic exposure as a class would be compensated in proportion
to the damages they sustain, although each individual plaintiff would be either overcompensated
or undercompensated" (footnote omitted)).
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unfair or overly generous. Those who develop a disease receive a fraction of
their medical costs, lost wages, and nonpecuniary damages arising from the
defendant's tortious conduct, while others receive a windfall."" One can de-
flect this criticism, however, by viewing proportional recovery not as a partial
payment of potential damages but as the equivalent of insurance premiums to
protect against the risk of future harm." Economists, for example, define the
value of an insurance premium as risk multiplied by expected loss.76 Follow-
ing this logic, several commentators recently have proposed just that - com-
pensating for enhanced risk by allowing those exposed to toxins to recover
insurance premiums designed to cover the risk of fiture disease." Ifthis form
of proportional liability is the basis for a tort award, offering plaintiffs protec-
tion for the risk they face resolves the over- and undercompensation prob-
lem." Thus, the overcompensation and undercompensation problem seems
74. Carson, supra note 13, at 649-50 (footnote omitted).
75. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice, supra note 65, at 219 (stating that enhanced risk
claims would "compel the tortfeasor to pay a mass-exposure plaintiff the premium that would
purchase an insurance policy providing tort-type and tort-level damages in the event that the
ultimate accrued harm occurs"); see also FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED
CANCER AND THE LAW: RISKS, REGULATION AND VICTIM COMPENSATION 210 (1989) ("An
individual suffering a certain probabalistic future risk of cancer should receive a damage award
equivalent to the present cost of adequately insuring against probable future costs associated
with the particular risk."); cf Troyen A. Brennan, Book Review, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 511, 515
(1990) (questioning ability of insurers to write such policies).
76. Professor Steven Shavell explained:
This assumption implies that the insurer can be virtually sure of covering its costs
by collecting from each insured the expected value of the amount it will have to pay
him. If, for instance, each insured faces a 5 percent risk of losing 10,000, and will
be paid that amount in the event of a loss under the insurance policy, the insurer can
cover its costs by collecting premiums of 500.
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 192 (1987).
77. SeeAshtonsupra note 13, at 1122; Carson, supra note 13, at650;Note, Latenttarms,
supra note 8, at 1517; Evans, supra note 47, at 58.
78. See Carson, supra note 13, at 650-51 (explaining that remedy avoids overcompensa-
tion and undercompensation problems). Of course, the reality of such a solution will depend
on the availability of the type of information that is necessary for insurers to set useful premi-
ums. See Ashton, supra note 13, at 1130 (stating that availability of insurance remedy depends
on ability to predict future costs). A recent note in the Harvard Law Review advocates the
payment of the value of insurance premiums in latent harm cases, but only after an evaluation
of four factors: (1) the expense of risk determination; (2) the availability and efficiency of
insurance; (3) the defendant's prospective judgment-proof status; and (4) the availability of
evidence. Note, Latent Harms, supra note 8, at 1513-16. Of course, a problem arises under
such a process when the factors do not point toward proportional recovery. In such a case,
traditional tort law options will be limited to the unsatisfying "all-or-nothing" regime. Others
have suggested, however, that similar situations might be addressed outside the tort system
altogether. See E. Donald Elliott, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 799,
801-05 (1985) [hereinafter Elliott, Why Courts?] (advocating administrative compensation
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tractable, at least with "perfect world" assumptions and a belief in the avail-
ability of insurance in this type of setting.79
Proportional liability advocates, however, face additional criticism from
those who assert that, as a moral matter, rules of tort law must relate to notions
ofcorrectivejustice. In general, one may view corrective justice in tort law as
a "defendant's obligation to compensate for harm that she has caused wrong-
fully or in violation of the plaintiff's rights. 8° Scholars describe the contours
of corrective justice in various ways."1 In a broad sense, however, corrective
justice scholars assertthattort liabilitymust relateto anexus - a transaction" -
between the parties to a lawsuit.82 As Professor Ernest Weinrib, a leading
corrective justice scholar, wrote: "[Corrective justice] considers the position
of the parties anterior to the transaction as equal, and it restores this antecedent
equality by transferring resources from defendant to plaintiff so that the gain
realized by the former is used to make up the loss suffered by the latter." 3
In more common tort parlance, the key to establishing this nexus is the
requirement of cause in fact84 - that is, the plaintiff must prove that he would
system for those exposed to toxins); see also infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text (ad-
vocating combination of tort law and administrative compensation for increased risk cases).
79. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing insurance); infra notes 136-
41 and accompanying text (discussing "perfect world" assumptions in proportional recovery
regime).
80. Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice andLiabilityforRisk-Creation: A Comment,
38 UCLA L. REV. 113, 125-26 & n.47 (1990).
81. Professor Simons succinctly described the views of some of the academy's leading
corrective justice scholars:
Jules Coleman thinks that corrective justice involves undoing wrongful gains and
wrongful losses, though he gives a nonobvious, technical meaning to "wrongful."
Ernest Weinrib defines corrective justice as the obligation of a negligent "doer" to
respect the equality of the victimized "sufferer." Richard Epstein, prior to becom-
ing a born-again utilitarian, defined corrective justice as one of several paradigmatic
forms of causal liability. George Fletcher defines corrective justice as liability for
imposing nonreciprocal risks. Catherine Wells argues that corrective justice entails
providing a fair adjudicative process to determine whether the defendant is respon-
sible for the plaintiff's loss. And Richard Posner, bless his heart, reaches the
felicitous conclusion that "corrective injustice" is just another way of saying "max-
imize social wealth."
Id. at 126 & nn.47-53.
82. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW &
PHIL. 37,38 (1982) [hereinafter Weinrib, Moral Theory].
83. Id. Corrective justice theorists contrast their views to "utilitarians," such as Holmes
or Posner, whom are said to view wealth maximization as the ultimate goal of tort law. Id. at
43-44. Weinrib, for example, argued that utilitarianism cannot provide a moral foundation for
tort law because it fails to require a direct linkage between plaintiff and defendant Id. at 46.
84. See id. at 38 (stating that "the requirement of factual causation establishes the indis-
pensable nexus between the parties by relating their rights to a transaction in which one has
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not have suffered an injury "but for" the conduct of the defendant." Obvi-
ously, the plaintiff will not be able to satisfy this burden in the vast majority
of enhanced risk cases. In fact, in many cases, proportional recovery would
permit plaintiffs to recover when it is more likely than not that the defendant's
conduct will have absolutely no future impact on the plaintiff. Such a result
troubles corrective justice theorists because it imposes tort liability without
proof of a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff s harm.86
Indeed, corrective justice scholars have been outright hostile to the notion of
violating this principle in the pursuit of the efficiency that proportional
liability advocates hope to achieve."
Scholars favoring deterrence as the primary goal oftort law have returned
the disparagement, occasionally describing the bases of corrective justice as
"abstruse,188 "highly artificial,"8 9 or "at odds with the accepted norms of our
present tort law, which routinely involves probabilistic assessment of victim
injuries."9 At least two scholars, however, recently wrote articles that might
help to bridge this chasm.
directly impinged upon the other"); Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 C-L-
KENT L. REV. 407,429-30 (1987) [hereinafter Weinrib, Causation] (explaining that "causation
particularizes by singling out this plaintiff from the class of persons whom the defendant has
endangered"); see also Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The
Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435-36 (1985); Richard W. Wright,
Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, andProof. Pruning theBramble
Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1004 (1988); cf Jules L. Coleman,
Moral Theories of Tort: TheirScope andLimits: Part, 2 LAW& PHIL. 5, 6-7 (1983) (asserting
that corrective justice involves negating wrongful gains and losses, but does not necessarily
involve equating liability with exact harm caused); Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Correc-
tive Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 201-06 (1981) (disputing
need for linkage between responsibility and bearing costs of harm caused). More recently,
however, Professor Christopher H. Schroeder argued that causation should not be a predicate for
correctivejustice. See Christopher . Schroeder, Corrective Justice andLiabityfor Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLAL. REv. 439,439 (1990) [hereinafter SchroederIncreasingRisks].
85. See KEETONET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 265-66.
86. Cf Robinson, supra note 16, at 790-91 (stating that Weinrib's view of corrective
justice would "exclude[ ] [probabilistic recovery] virtually by definition").
87. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV.
537, 537 (1972) (referring to commentary that "cultivate[s] the idiom of cst-spreading... and
cost avoidance"); Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility:
Unscientific Formalism andFalse Semantics, 63 C-L-KENT L. REV. 553, 578 (1987) (stating
that tort law "has no room for efficiency theory").
88. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice, supra note 65, at 232 ("Abstruse Kantian notions
of free will aside, there is little reason why the'harmful consequences of otherwise wrongfully
created risk should escape correction simply because not all of the possible injurious effects
have occurred or will occur .... ).
89. Robinson, supra note 16, at 791.
90. Id.; see Rosenberg, Individual Justice, supra note 65, at 232 (criticizing theories of
corrective justice).
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Professor Christopher Schroeder, for one, argued that corrective justice
theorists are not consistent when they identify actual causation as an absolute
predicate to corrective justice ideals.91 Schroeder noted that corrective justice
theorists assert that tort law should focus on the "ex ante" - the choice that an
actor makes "at the time he is confronted with the situation demanding a
choice to be made. '"I A focus on actual causation, however, requires a focus
on the "ex post" - an after-the-fact evaluation of whether the defendant's con-
duct led to the plaintiff's harm.93 Professor Schroeder wrote that "[g]iven the
pervasive influence of the ex ante perspective in moral theory, the persistence
of causation in tort is an anomaly, and one that deepens when we appreciate
how much that influence has already spread into legal theory. '94 Therefore,
rather than relying on proof of actual causation as the key to a system of
corrective justice, Professor Schroeder proposed that tort law should hold
actors liable for the creation of risk from the moment they act.95 In this way,
Professor Schroeder's argument resembles proposals for proportional liabil-
ity.96 However, rather than presenting his proposal as at loggerheads with
91. See generally Schroeder, Increasing Risks, supra note 84. Schroeder noted, however,
that corrective justice itself is "one of the two most powerful theories of tort in American legal
thought today." Id. at 439.
92. Id. at451.
93. See id. at 455-56 (discussing focus on actual causation).
94. Id. at 457; see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation, Compensation, and Moral
Responsibility, in PHiLOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 347,349 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995) [hereinafter Schroeder, Moral Responsibility] (describing requirement of causation as
"often fortuitous and thus morally arbitrary").
95. See Schroeder, IncreasingRisks, supra note 84, at466 (proposing thattort law should
hold actors liable for the creation of risk from moment they act). It is not entirely clear, how-
ever, that Professor Schroeder would allow plaintiffs actually to recover any payments until
actual harm manifested. See Simons, supra note 80, at 116, 122-24 (raising questions about
Schroeder's proposal in this regard). In an article responding to Professor Simons, Professor
Schroeder stated that he would be "perfectly willing to entertain such a system" that allows
plaintiffs to recover damages upon the creation of risk. Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective
Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. REV. 143, 159 (1990) [hereinafter
Schroeder, Corrective Justice]. Such a system, Professor Schroeder suggested, might even be
consistent with principles of corrective justice "insofar as it simply represents a better way to
insure that plaintiffs who are eventually injured receive compensation for their injuries." Id.
Alternatively, Professor Schroeder suggested: "[Is] exposure to the risk of harm [ itself a
violation of plaintiff autonomy sufficient to trigger recovery [?] ... In other words, is the risk
of harm itself a harm? The answer may be yes, but less obviously than in the case of physical
injury," and thus might justify risk-exposure recovery. Id. at 160.
96. Again, with the caveat that Professor Schroeder's initial article envisions proportional
liability without immediate compensation. See Schroeder, Increasing Risks, supra note 84, at
470-71; cf Schroeder, Corrective Justice, supra note 95, at 159-60 (suggesting that "exposed
individuals could take the risk exposure payments and purchase liability insurance more
efficiently than a centralized compensation fund" and speculating that "[w]hether this method
of accomplishing the ends of corrective justice is superior to the earlier article's proposal
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corrective justice, Professor Schroeder asserted that the system is consistent
with corrective justice: "By translating expected harm to others into an
immediate cost to the agent, the legal rules provide a built-in incentive to
engage in just the deliberatively rational process that the ex ante theory con-
templates."9
More recently, and more broadly, Professor Gary Schwartz advocated a
"mixed theory" of tort law that accounts for the concerns of scholars in both
the deterrence and corrective justice camps.9" Drawing on a similar, yet
friendlier, debate in the area of criminal law,' Professor Schwartz challenged
the conventional wisdom that the two goals are mutually exclusive:
[T] ort law obviously fails to achieve its goal of comprehensive deterrence:
there is, after all, an ample amount of negligence in society. Still, inas-
much as tortlawis sometimes successful in deterringtortious conduct, this
success should be of keen interest to corrective justice analysts, since it
minimizes the problem of injustice that those scholars address."°
Without diminishing the fuller arguments that Professor Schwartz set forth,
his point in the quote above appears to have application in the enhanced risk
setting. That is, the attempt of proportional liability scholars to achieve their
deterrence goal should appeal to corrective justice scholars who want to hold
defendants morally responsible for any damage they eventually cause. The
corrective justice objection to proportional liability, therefore, may not be an
insurmountable hurdle to the consideration of proportional liability as part of
an approach to the enhanced risk problem.
Yet one major objection to proportional liability remains: A system of
proportional liability would place enormous administrative strains on the
judicial system. Professor Schroeder, in particular, recognized these strains
depends entirely on which scheme presents fewer practical difficulties of the sort I discussed
in the article").
97. Schroeder, Increasing Risks, supra note 84, at 466. Like Professor Schroeder,
Professor Margaret Berger set forth a proposal that she argued is consistent with the goal of
corrective justice despite the fact that the proposal does not rely on traditional notions of
causation. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New
Theory ofJusice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2134, 2140 (1997) (proposing tort
cause of action that relies, not on concept of general causation, but instead on duty to "develop
and disseminate significant data needed for risk assessment"). Professor Berger explained that
"[ilf a corporation fails to exercise the appropriate level of due care, it should be held liable to
those put at risk by its action, without regard to injuries that eventually ensue; it is culpable
because it has acted without taking into account the interests of those who will be affected by
its conduct." Id. at 2134; see infra notes 126, 184, 187 and accompanying text (discussing
Professor Berger's theory).
98. Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1801.
99. Seeid. at 1811-15.
100. Id. at 1827.
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as an obstacle to the enactment of a proportional liability system. 1' Using a
hypothetical involving a speeding motorist as an example, he conceded that
it would be nearly impossible in many instances to monitor each instance of
risk creation in society and to extract ex ante payments accordingly."° How-
ever, Professor Schroeder suggested that a proportional liability system might
be more realistic in toxic exposure cases:
[A]dministrative costs do not favor a [traditional] cause-based system in
toxic cases, because the detection oftoxic discharges (risks) is not substan-
tially more costly an undertaking than is detection of the source of toxic
related harm (causes). Furthermore, the number of liability events is
actuallyfewerunderaliability for risk system, where [an entity] is charged
once forthe entire risk created by its discharging, than underacause-based
system, where each discrete harm constitutes a discrete liability and liti-
gable event. 03
Professor Schroeder's point would make sense in a world that imposes
tort liability primarily through administrative fiat.104  However, the point
would become debatable if tort law retains its private character in which
individual plaintiffs seek to enforce liability through litigation. In fact, the
administrative costs associated with a risk-based liability scheme would likely
101. See Schroeder, Increasing Risks, supra note 84, at 474-77; see also Robinson, supra
note 16, at 796-97 & n.43 (discussing administrative costs associated with risk-based liability);
Lapeze, supra note 13, at 268 (suggesting that proportional liability system will open "flood-
gates" of litigation). Professor Berger, who proposed a system that would impose liability based
on a defendant's duty to develop and disseminate information concerning risk, also recognized
workability as a problem. Berger, supra note 97, at 2145; see infra notes 126, 187 and
accompanying text. Berger asserted, however, that an
advantage of the model is that the proof needed to establish liability is the kind of
evidence about a past event that our system handles well. It would, of course, be
costly and time consuming to esfablish a defendant's failure to exercise due care in
obtaining and disseminating substantial information about risk, although it would
be substantially cheaper than having to prove causation as well.
Berger, supra note 97, at 2149-50.
102. See Schroeder, Increasing Risks, supra note 84, at 473-74. Professor Schroeder
conceded that
one of the strengths of the existing system of tort is that it waits until a compensable
event has occurred before a costly lawsuit is permitted or necessary. Under a pure
liability for risk system, liability events become distinct from and potentially much
more numerous than compensable events, so that the intrusiveness and the adminis-
trative costs of the system ought to be substantially more than the present system's.
Id.; see id. at 477 (stating that "until fancy technologies are available, cases like Speeding
Motorist probably ought to continue to receive cause-based treatment").
103. Id. at 476-77.
104. Id. at 470 (discussing "compensation from administered funds, or having defendants
pay risk premiums into such funds at the moment they perform a risky act").
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be a larger hurdle in the toxic torts setting than anywhere else. To understand
this proposition, one must recognize the staggering number of toxic sub-
stances to which we are exposed in the late twentieth century. According to
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), billions of pounds
of hazardous chemicals are emitted into the air every year,0 5 and nearly
twenty percent of the U.S. population (approximately forty million people)
lives within four miles of a hazardous waste site that the EPA has placed on
its National Priority List."° Assuming that many of these toxins increase our
risk of disease to some extent, a pure proportional liability system would
allow millions of Americans to bring multiple enhanced risk tort actions. 7
Such an unreasonable proposition is what led courts to draw the lines that they
have - that only those with a present injury can sue °s and that only those who
can prove a probability of later manifestation can recover."° But, as discussed
above, these lines are not entirely sensible."' Instead, courts should begin to
look for a better line - a line that sensibly limits the number of enhanced risk
claims, is consistent with the desire for deterrence, and takes account of
notions of corrective justice. The following section of this Article attempts
to do just that.
IV A New Enhanced Risk Model
Tort law should permit enhanced risk recovery on a proportional basis,
but only when a plaintiff can prove that the toxic exposure has more than
105. See Paul J. KomyatteMedicalMonitoringDamages: An Evolution ofEnvironmental
Tort Law, 23 CoLo. LAW. 1533, 1533 (1994) (citing United States General Accounting Office,
Air Pollution: EPA's Strategy and Resources May Be Inadequate to Control Air Toxins
(Washington, D.C.: GAO/RCED-91-143, June 26, 1991) at 9)); see also Klein, Medical
Monitoring, supra note 10, at 13 (citing GAO report).
106. See Komyatte, supra note 105, at 1533 (reporting that "eight often Americans live
near some type of hazardous waste site"); see also Andrew R. Klein, Hazardous Waste Cleanup
and Intermediate Landowners: Reexamining the Liability-Based Approach, 21 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REV. 337,337-38 (1997) (discussing extent of present hazardous waste site problems).
107. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (rejecting
post-exposure, pre-symptom medical monitoring claim brought under Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act). In discussing the potential impact of an expansive liability system, the Court stated:
[T]ens of millions of individuals may have suffered exposure to substances that
might justify some form of substance-exposure-related medical monitoring ....
And that fact, along with uncertainty as to the amount of liability, could threaten
both a "flood" of less important cases... and the systemic harms that can accom-
pany "unlimited and unpredictable liability .... "
Id. at 442; see Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10, at 13-14 (discussing Metro-North).
108. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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doubled her risk of contracting disease in the future.'1 Fundamentally, this
standard correlates with the actual causation standard that courts apply in
cases where disease is manifest."' In other words, there should be no pre-
manifestation recovery for possible illness that a plaintiff cannot eventually
connect to a defendant's conduct using normal measures of actual causa-
tion.
113
111. Unlike current doctrine, the proposed standard would not require a plaintiff to demon-
strate that a toxic exposure caused him to suffer from some current physical harm, nor would it
require proof that a plaintiff is likely to actually contract disease in the future. As discussed
earlier in the Article, such a standard can be defended only as a way to limit the number of claims
that enter the tort system; however, it bears little relationship to the goal of deterring future
physical injury. See supra notes 43-45, 53-54 and accompanying text. Thus, the proposed
standard helps address the underdeterrence problem that plagues existing doctrine. On the other
hand, unlike proposals for pure proportional liability, the proposed standard would not permit
every person with any level of enhanced risk to pursue tort recovery. Thus, the proposed standard
removes, or at least significantly diminishes, the flood of litigation fear that is a real barrier to the
enhanced risk recovery theory. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
112. By design, the line also is consistent with a standard this author proposed in a recent
article about whether tort law should compensate pre-manifestation plaintiffs for the cost of
medical monitoring. See generally Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10. That article,
operating under the premise that additional medical surveillance would help detect and treat the
onset of disease, suggests that a doubling-of-the-risk standard would improve tort law's ability
to address pre-manifestation claims in an efficient manner while retaining a connection to tort
law's tradition of actual causation. Id. at 15-28. The standard for enhanced risk recovery set
forth in this Article, therefore, should be viewed as part of a larger vision about how tort law
should compensate the pre-manifestation plaintiff. In an effort to avoid duplication, this Article
does not address some of the points set forth in the previous article. Among these points is the
concern about how - or whether - tort law should address de minimis enhanced risk. See, e.g.,
ENTERPRISE REspONSB.TYuFOR PERSONAL NJRY, supra note 64, at 373-74, 379-80 & n.60
(discussing significance of slight increases in risk of disease); Brennan, supra note 5, at 69
(suggesting that courts limit medical monitoring remedies to situations impacting large numbers
of people). In the medical monitoring arena, some "cut-off" level seems sensible because the
compensation at issue (the costs of medical surveillance) bears no relation to the level of
enhanced risk. See KleinMedicalMonitoring, supra note 10, at 16-18 (discussing relationship
between compensation and level of enhanced risk). The need for such a "cut-off," however, is
not so compelling in the enhanced risk arena where the level of recovery would be directly
proportional to the level of enhanced risk. See, e.g., infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text
(discussing possibility of limiting recovery to level of enhanced risk). For example, under this
Article's proposal, a person whose level of risk for a particular disease increased from .5% to
1% would be able to recover .5% of the cost of his future disease, even though he might not be
able to recover medical monitoring costs under the prior article's proposal. See Klein, Medical
Monitoring, supra note 10, at 17-18; infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text. The enhanced
risk recovery, however, is logical from a deterrence standpoint because it proportionately
compensates for the possibility of future harm. Further, a person in such a position might well
decide that the small recovery is not even worth the cost of litigation and decide to wait for the
unlikely manifestation to occur before he sues. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 788 (suggesting
that such choice is important).
113. See infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
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As detailed below, this correlation would reduce the tension that en-
hanced risk recovery has with corrective justice theory." 4 It would create a
system that is more administratively plausible than a system of pure propor-




Commentators have documented the tremendous difficulties inherent in
proving causation in post-manifestation toxic tort cases." 7 However, a brief
description of the topic is relevant to explaining this Article's proposed
standard, given the standard's explicit connection to causation in the post-
manifestation setting.
Initially, one should recall that tort law normally requires a plaintiff to
connect her injury, by a preponderance of the evidence, to a defendant's
tortious act or omission."' This connection may be relatively easy to prove
in a run-of-the-mill case. However, it can be quite difficult to prove in a toxic
exposure case both because of the latency problem" 9 and because the plaintiff
may have been exposed to more than one disease-causing toxin. In light of
these problems, courts generally require toxic exposure plaintiffs to jump
through two "hoops" in order to prove actual causation. First, plaintiffs must
114. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text
116. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text Economists do not often advocate
rules based on the ex post approach of actual causation. See Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1817
& n.123 (remarking that "language of causation" is "alien" to an economist (citing Guido
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essayfor Hany Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHL
L. REV. 69, 105 (1975))). However, as Professor Schwartz pointed out, the "actual causation
test produces results that are roughly acceptable for deterrence purposes." Schwartz, supra note
21, at 1817. Drawing a standard with a connection to actual causation in an enhanced risk case
would seem to be especially palatable to an economist because, unlike in most cases, the causa-
tion standard would be used in an ex ante fashion - the law would be setting a liability standard
based on an attempt to determine the level of future harm that the defendant's conduct would
cause in the future.
117. See Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10, at 18-23. For a more detailed treat-
ment of the topic, see generally Gerald W. BostonA Mass Exposure Model of Toxic Causation:
The Content of Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181
(1993) and Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643 (1992). For an example of a recent case that has
grappled with issues of toxic causation, see Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
118. See KFETONET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 265-66; Paul J. Zwier, "Cause in Fact" in
Tort Law -A Philosophical and HistoricalExamination, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 769,785 (1982)
(discussing role of individualism in development of cause in fact requirement).
119. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
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prove general causation - that the substance in question is capable of causing
their disease. 2 Second, individual plaintiffs must prove specific causation -
that the substance in question caused the particular plaintiff s disease."2
Because scientific proof of specific causation is often difficult to obtain,
however, many courts permit plaintiffs to recover if the plaintiffs show that
the exposure increased their risk of contracting disease."z
The debate about what is necessary to prove causation in this fashion is
far from settled."r Some courts and commentators, for example, have pro-
posed a "strong" version of the preponderance rule, requiring both scientific
evidence that exposure increased the chance of disease by more than fifty
percent and "particularistic" evidence that the exposure led to disease in an
individual plaintiff.24 Others have advocated a weaker version of the prepon-
derance rule that would permit verdicts to stand solely upon statistical evi-
dence."2 Still others have proposed that toxic tort law jettison the entire
concept of using probabilities to prove general causation. 26
120. See Hamner, 953 S.W.2d at 714 (discussing general causation) (citing Joseph Sanders,
From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 14 (1993)); BOSTON & MADDEN, supra note 5, at 342-45 (same) (quoting Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Individ-
ualAction and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma ofMass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV.
845, 860 (1987) (referring to general and specific causation as "substance" and "source"
causation).
121. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714 (discussing specific and general causation); BOSTON
& MADDEN, supra note 5, at 342-45 (same).
122. According to the Havner court,
[t]he finder of fact is asked to infer that because the risk is demonstrably greater in
the general population due to exposure to the substance, the claimant's injury was
more likely than not caused by that substance. Such a theory concedes that science
cannot tell us what caused a particular plaintiff's injury. It is based on a policy
determination that when the incidence of a disease or injury is sufficiently elevated
due to exposure to a substance, someone who was exposed to that substance and
exhibits the disease or injury can raise a fact question on causation.
Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714.
123. See Klein, MedicalMonitoring, supra note 10, at 19-23 (discussing level of increased
risk necessary to prove specific causation).
124. See Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 705, 715 (Tex. 1997) (discussing
"strong" version of preponderance rule (citing In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1985))); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Causal
Connection] (noting proposals for strong version of preponderance rule).
125. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715 (noting weaker version of preponderance rule);
Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 124, at 857-58 (same).
126. See Berger, supra note 97, at 2140 (advocating cause of action premised on defen-
dant's duty to "develop and disseminate" information that courts could use for risk assessment
purposes); id. at 2134 (suggesting that "[i]f a corporation fails to exercise the appropriate level
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Despite this wide range of opinion, a number of courts have coalesced
around a standard that considers whether scientific evidence suggests that
causation was "more than 50 percent probable."'27 In epidemiological terms,
this threshold is the equivalent of saying that the "relative risk" of disease
based on exposure is greater than two." In such a situation, the risk of dis-
ease in an exposed population would be more than double the risk of disease
in a non-exposed population.'29 That, of course, is exactly the standard that
this Article suggests that courts should use when determining whether to
award enhanced risk damages before a disease manifests. 3 '
of due care, it should be held liable to those put at risk by its action, without regard to injuries
that eventually ensue" and asserting that "it is culpable because it has acted without taking into
account the interests of those who will be affected by its conduct"). Professor Berger would
permit defendants to exculpate themselves by showing either (1) "that certain adverse health
reactions could not plausibly arise from exposure to defendant's product" or (2) that the court
should reduce damages because a "particular plaintiff's injury is attributable or partly attribut-
able to another cause, such as smoking." Id. at 2144-45.
127. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
128. Epidemiology is the scientific discipline concerned with disease distribution and
determinants among human populations. In epidemiology, "relative risk" compares the risk of
disease among an exposed population with the risk of disease among a non-exposed population.
Mathematically, the equation R1/R2 represents relative risk when RI is the risk of disease
among the exposed population and R2 is the risk of disease in the non-exposed population. See
BOSTON & MADDEN, supra note 5, at 352,354; Green, supra note 117, at 647.48.
If the relative risk equals one (i.e., the numerator is the same as the denominator),
the risk in the exposed group is the same as the risk in the nonexposed group, and
there is no suggestion of any association between the exposure and the disease in
question. If the relative risk is greater than one, the risk in the exposed group is
greater than in the non-exposed group, and there is a positive association between
the exposure and the disease.
BOSTON & MADDEN, supra note 5, at 354; see also Green, supra note 117, at 644-48.
129. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995)
(requiring risk of disease in exposed population to be twice that in non-exposed population in
order for plaintiffs to recover); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 911 F.2d 941, 958-59 (3d Cir.
1990) (same); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996) (same);
Manko v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 1419, 1434 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (same); Marder v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986) (same); Cook v. United States, 545 F.
Supp. 306,308 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (same); Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 716 (same).
130. See supra notes 111-29 and accompanying text. To be sure, the "doubling standard"
has its complications. See Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10, at 20-23. Professor
Green, in particular, argued that courts should not apply a burden of production that requires
epidemiological evidence because in many cases epidemiological evidence simply does not
exist. Green, supra note 117, at 674-95. Instead, Professor Green argued that "plaintiffs should
be required to prove causation by a preponderance of the available evidence, not by some
predetermined standard that may require nonexistent studies." Id. at 680. This does not mean,
however, that Professor Green rejected the doubling standard itself; rather, he objected that
courts have wrongly "created a veneer of infallibility and conclusiveness" around epidemiology
studies. Id. at 699.
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B. Supporting Theory
The proposed standard provides a common sense equilibrium. The tort
system would not hold a defendant liable for creating a risk of harm when a
court would not attribute the harm to the defendant's conduct ifthe harm were
to occur later."' Although this equilibrium might not completely satisfy some
corrective justice theorists,132 it should represent an improvement over propos-
als for pure proportional liability, and, perhaps, create a setting in which
Professor Schwartz's "mixed theory" of tort law could take root. 3
For example, Professor Weinrib viewed "[t]he requirement of factual
causation [as] establish[ing] the indispensable nexus between the parties by
relating their rights to a transaction in which one has directly impinged upon
the other."134 A system of pure proportional liability would inevitably violate
131. In general, this standard would limit pre-manifestation recovery to eases involving
substances around which a "mature" body of scientific evidence has developed. See, e.g.,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing court's
task as "daunting" when dispute "concerns matters at the very cutting edge of scientific research,
where fact meets theory and certainty dissolves into probability"); Schneck v. IBM Corp.,
Civ.No. 92-4370, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10126, at *12-*13 (D.N.J. June 21, 1996) (denying
consolidation of similar toxic tort eases when scientific evidence is not "mature") (citing
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LIriGATION § 33.26, at 322 (3d ed. 1995)). For example, scientific
evidence linking tobacco or asbestos to human disease has matured. See Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1973) (tracing knowledge of asbestos-
related health risks to 1920s and noting that U.S. Public Health Service documented risks
associated with asbestos exposure in 1938); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163,
1167 & nn.1-4 (1998) (citing numerous studies linking tobacco to human disease); Irene Scharf,
Breathe Deeply: The Tort of Smokers'Battery, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 615,616 n.2 (1995) (tracing
studies of tobacco-related disease to 1891). In contrast, evidence presented in the early 1990s
concerning breast implants was not sufficiently mature to connect the implants to harm. See
Gina Kolata, Implants Cause NoMajor Disease, CHAPLOTTE OBSERVER, June 21,1999, at 4A
(reporting that "[a]n independent panel of 13 scientists convened by the Institute of Medicine
at the request of Congress has concluded that silicone breast implants do not cause any major
diseases"). See generally MARCIA ANGELL, ScmNcE ON TRIAL (1996) (discussing use of scien-
tific evidence in tort cases). The standard proposed in this Article, therefore, would significantly
restrict tort access for pre-manifestation plaintiffs; they would not recover until scientific
evidence was sufficiently mature to establish a causal link between their exposure and their
disease. This limitation should not prevent society from addressing the health problems associ-
ated with toxic exposure at the earliest possible stage. Nevertheless, the tort system is the wrong
place to do so until scientific evidence matures. See infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 82, at 38-40 (discussing importance of providing nexus
between plaintiff's injury and defendant's wrong); cf. Schroeder, Increasing Risks, supra note
84 (asserting that tort system should enforce "norms of morality").
133. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. As Professor Schwartz pointed out,
however, leading corrective justice scholars have not been especially open to this notion. See
Schwartz, supra note 21, at 1815.
134. Weinrib, supra note 82, at 38; see supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text
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this requirement: A plaintiff could recover damages despite (1) suffering from
no current disease, (2) being unable to show that he is likely ever to suffer
from disease, and (3) being unable to show that, if he did contract the disease,
he could establish a causal connection to the defendant's conduct. Thus, any
connection to actual causation in a system of proportional liability would be
purely fortuitous.
The proposal in this Article, however, would reduce the tension with cor-
rective justice theorists by eliminating the third point above. Proportional
recovery would attach at the time of the risk creation only when a plaintiff
demonstrated that a causal link would exist if the disease were to manifest.
The connection to causation is then explicit and intentional, rather than non-
existent or fortuitous. In addition, this link to causation- Professor Weinrib's
"indispensable nexus" - would assure that utilitarian concerns alone do not
drive the rule. In this way, the rule would again appeal to the corrective justice
theorist, at least as an alternative to a system of pure proportional liability.135
Of course, by refusing to establish even proportional liability for those
who cannot prove a doubling ofthe risk, this proposal is open to the criticism
that led to pure proportional liability suggestions in the first place: the law
would not force actors to internalize the true costs of their activities at the
time they create risk.'36 In a perfect world, that may be true. But, the proposal
here is hardly blind to deterrence and is, in many ways, a more realistic effort
to improve upon current enhanced risk doctrine than are proposals for pure
proportional liability.
Recall that one of the fundamental concerns about tort law recovery for
enhanced risk involves the possibility of both under- and overdeterrence.137
In other words, som6 view enhanced risk recovery as a windfall to those who
never contract disease. As discussed above, this criticism is tractable in a
perfect world, where we assume that everyone exposed to risk receives a
proportional payment. 38 However, if the perfect world is not attainable, 39 it
makes sense to focus on those plaintiffi who would be able to prove actual
causation if they actually were to contract the disease. 40 In this way, we
compel actors to internalize the risks only of those future harms that the tort
system would attribute to their conduct.
41
135. See Weinrib, supra note 82, at 38-40.
136. See supra notes 43-45, 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence).
137. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (noting overdeterrence and under-
deterrence problem).
138. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text
139. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing inefficiencies associated
with tort system).
140. See supra note 131.




Finally, it is unrealistic from an administrative standpoint to suggest that
the tort system should be the vehicle to address all cases of enhanced risk that
toxic exposure causes.142 Given the enormous amount of toxins to which we
are exposed, the "flood of litigation" concern would be no trivial matter if we
could all sue for enhanced risk at any time. Furthermore, litigation is not an
efficient way to achieve deterrence. The transaction costs associated with
litigation are enormous,143 and are likely to be especially large when proof of
causation is tenuous." This suggestion does not dispute that risk deterrence
is an important function of the tort system. Again, the standard proposed here
accomplishes exactly that - but only when mature evidence suggests that the
eventual manifestation of harm could be connected to the defendant's con-
duct. 4 In other cases, there are fairer and more efficient ways to address
unmatured risk.
146
In short, this Article suggests that tort law should permit post-exposure,
pre-symptom plaintiffs to recover damages only when they demonstrate that
the exposure in question at least has doubled their risk of disease. This
standard has a fundamental correlation to the actual causation standard that
compensation. In these instances, society should rely on administrative compensation to
achieve these goals. For a brief discussion of this author's views on this topic, see Klein,
MedicalMonitoring, supra note 10, at 33-37.
142. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (noting administrative difficulties of
addressing enhanced risk in tort cases). Even Professor Robinson states that the "class of cases
for which risk-based liability would be a useful concept is a limited one." Robinson, supra note
16, at 797 & n.43. But cf Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 124, at 908-15 (promot-
ing use of class actions to resolve mass exposure cases).
143. See Gary T. Schwartz, The A.LJ. Reporters' Study, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 529, 537
(1993) (estimating that for every dollar that comes into the tort system, only forty or fifty cents
ends up compensating injured victims). Professor Schwartz argued that "when tort law is
considered from the perspective of efficiently compensating accident victims, its very high
overhead becomes quite hard to justify." Id.; see also Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
AnythingAbout the Behavior of the TortLitigation System -And WhyNot?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147, 1282 (1992) (stating that transaction costs are most expensive part of litigation); Stephen
D. Sugarman, DoingAway with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 598-603 (1985) (discussing
high transaction costs involved in Agent Orange, Bendectin, IUD, and asbestos litigation).
Professor Saks reported that in the middle 1980s "it cost society $1.92 to deliver $1 of compen-
sation to a victim of negligent injury." Saks, supra, at 1282.
144. See, e.g., Saks, supra note 143, at 1282 (discussing high cost of litigating asbestos
claims); Sugarman, supra note 143, at 600-01 (noting difficulty of proving causation in asbestos
claims and high cost of asbestos litigation); see also Andrew R. Klein, Beyond DES: Rejecting
the Application ofMarket Share Liability in Blood Products Litigation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 883
(1994) (discussing transaction costs associated with blood products litigation).
145. See supra note 131.
146. See Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10, at 33-37 (exploring ways to address
enhanced risk outside tort system).
56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1173 (1999)
courts apply in cases where disease in fact does manifest. Because of this
correlation, the standard takes account of corrective justice concerns, while
addressing the goal of deterrence in a more precise and plausible manner than
would a system of pure proportional liability.
V Applications
The previous section proposed a new enhanced risk standard. This
section demonstrates how that standard would work. The section also dis-
cusses how enhanced risk recovery would operate in conjunction with other
latent harm causes of action, such as medical monitoring. 47
A. Tort Law Applies
Assume that BigCo has negligently exposed five thousand citizens in
Niceville to a large quantity of "toxzene." Assume further that epidemiologi-
cal studies indicate that the level of exposure experienced by Niceville's
citizens has increased their risk of liver cancer from 5% to 15%. Finally,
assume that no citizen has manifested any symptoms of disease related to
toxzene exposure. Under current doctrine, the citizens of Niceville cannot
maintain an enhanced risk claim against BigCo because (1) they do not suffer
from current physical manifestations of disease 48 and (2) no individual citizen
can demonstrate the probability that she will suffer from liver cancer in the
future.
149
Under the standard proposed here, however, each citizen of Niceville
could maintain a claim for enhanced risk. The key, of course, is the doubling
of risk. Any Niceville citizen who develops liver cancer in the future would
be able to connect the disease to the BigCo exposure - that is, it is more likely
than not that the exposure caused future liver cancer cases.' In this way, we
force BigCo to internalize costs only for risks which may mature into tort
liabilities.
If each Niceville citizen could recover the full amount of damages
associated with a case of liver cancer, however, serious concerns about
overdeterrence would arise because many citizens will never actually contract
cancer. Thus, it is sensible to borrow from proportional liability proposals
when considering damages in this setting. In particular, tort law should link
the amount of recovery to the level of increased risk. In this case, plaintiffs
could recover 10% of the cost of an actual liver cancer case. As discussed
147. See infra notes 156-61, 166-67 and accompanying text; supra note 112.
148. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing "more likely than not" causa-
tion standard); supra notes 111-30 and accompanying text (same).
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above, this sum would approximate the premium on an insurance policy
covering the increased risk that each plaintiff must bear. 5 '
Implicit in permitting recovery based on the price of insurance, however,
is the idea that courts should not permit plaintiffs who do develop disease to
return to court to seek additional compensation. This notion is consistent with
the principles underlying the "single action" rule.'52 Therefore, if a plaintiff
files an enhanced risk claim under the standard set forth in this Article, a court
will need to determine at the same time whether the plaintiff can maintain
other claims related to the toxic exposure.'53 Such actions typically include
claims for fear of disease and for medical monitoring in an effort to detect and
treat disease as quickly as possible. 4 The "fear of disease" cases are outside
the scope of this Article because such cases generally compensate for emo-
tional, rather than physical, harm. 5 Claims for medical monitoring, however,
closely relate to claims for enhanced risk and merit discussion here.
As this author has argued in a previous article, the baseline for permitting
post-exposure, pre-symptom medical monitoring recovery should be the same
as the standard set forth herein - the plaintiff should demonstrate that the
toxic exposure at least has doubled the risk of disease.'56 Indeed, the proper
way to view medical monitoring recovery is as part of the compensation for
enhanced risk itself, not as compensation for the "separate" injury viewed as
the need for medical monitoring.' Assuming that the plaintiff can introduce
testimony that medical procedures exist that would make the early detection
and treatment of disease possible and beneficial,' 58 the plaintiff who can prove
a doubling of the risk should be able to recover the costs of such procedures
in addition to proportional enhanced risk recovery. Beyond the arguments
151. See supra notes 75-79, 138 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing "single action" rule).
153. A plaintiff, however, should not be compelled to file an action prior to manifestation.
Statutes of limitations, then, should not bar claims before that point in time. See Robinson,
supra note 16, at 788.
154. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (discussing pre-manifestation claims
other than enhanced risk).
155. However, some courts do determine the legitimacy of plaintiffs' fears based, in part,
on how likely it is the disease will occur. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863
P.2d 795, 810-16 (Cal. 1993). Thus, there may be some connection between the level of
enhanced risk and recovery for the fear of disease.
156. See KleinMedicalMonitoring, supra note 10, at 16.
157. See id. at 15-16.
158. See id. at 15 n.68; see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,787 (3d
Cir. 1994) (stating that if plaintiff could not prove that medical procedures exist making early
detection and treatment of disease possible and beneficial, then plaintiff could not recover
medical monitoring expenses (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d
Cir. 1990))).
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advanced in this Article, applying the doubling ofthe risk standard to medical
monitoring has the added benefit of helping to mitigate future harm, and,
perhaps, future liability."5 9 Assuring medical monitoring also may have the
effect of lowering the cost of the enhanced risk "insurance premium" compo-
nent of the tort award.
Therefore, to continue with the example set forth above, assume that the
citizens of Niceville introduce evidence that medical procedures exist that
would make the early detection and treatment of disease possible and benefi-
cial. Their tort awards then would include both proportional recovery for the
enhanced risk and an amount that would cover the cost ofmedical monitoring.
As suggested above, the single action rule then would preclude the plaintiff
from ever suing again to recover for harms associated with the exposure.1 60
This result achieves a number of goals. First, by making defendants internal-
ize the possibility of future costs related to their risk creation, the result serves
tort law's deterrence objective. Second, by including payment for medical
monitoring, the result mitigates the possibility of future disease. Third, by
limiting the result to cases in which a plaintiff can prove a doubling of the
risk, the result relies on the link to actual causation that provides the underpin-
nings for corrective justice.'6 '
B. Tort Law Partially Applies
As explained in the previous section, the doubling of the risk standard
normally supplies a logical standard for the recovery of both enhanced risk
and medical monitoring damages.' 62 However, it is worth noting one type of
instance in which this is not true - when the level of risk involved is extremely
small. In such cases, it is feasible to allow a plaintiffto maintain an enhanced
risk claim but not a medical monitoring claim.
159. The question of future liability depends in large part on how one resolves the statute
of limitations questions raised earlier in the Article. See supra notes 7, 41-49 and accompany-
ing text. If one views the discovery of the existence of enhanced risk as the date of accrual,
there may be no future liability for the manifestation of disease. However, if one is willing to
give plaintiffs a choice of waiting for the disease to manifest itself before filing suit (i.e., if one
tolls the statute of limitations until manifestation), then future liabilities may exist. In addition,
giving plaintiffs a choice to wait until manifestation to sue could encourage defendants to fund
medical monitoring programs in appropriate circumstances. Cf Robinson, supra note 16, at
788 (stating that he does not propose "requiring victims to pursue recovery for risk if they prefer
to await the outcome and seek compensation for actual injury" and that "[tihe question is
whether there is reason to deny an action to a risk victim who does not want to wait... to find
out whether injury ensues").
160. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing single action rule).
161. See supra notes 80-87, 135 and accompanying text (discussing corrective justice).
162. Recovery of medical monitoring damages assumes, of course, that the plaintiff can
present evidence that medical procedures exist that would make the early detection and treat-
ment of disease possible and beneficial. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
1204
ENHANCED RISK
Continuing with the earlier hypothetical, suppose that BigCo negligently
exposed the citizens of Niceville to "chemilite," and that studies show the
level of exposure increased their risk of a rare form of cancer from 3 in 10,000
to 7 in 10,000.163 Suppose further that experts are willing to testify that
expensive medical procedures exist that would make the early detection and
treatment of the cancer possible. In such a case, there is little problem with
keeping the tort system open to a plaintiff who wants to proceed with an
enhanced risk claim." Recovery in such cases would remain directly propor-
tional to the small level of risk; therefore, the plaintiff would receive only a
small award which would force the defendant to internalize only an appropri-
ate amount considering the level of risk created. Indeed, the amount of
recovery in such a case would be so small that most people might not even
bother bringing a lawsuit.165
Medical monitoring recovery, however, would be troubling because the
amounts of the awards would not bear any proportional relationship to the
number of cases of disease that would actually occur. Without this relation-
ship, a serious risk of overdeterrence might result from a broad use of medical
monitoring awards." The standard as applied to medical monitoring recov-
ery, therefore, should incorporate some minimal level of enhanced risk as a
threshold to recovery.16 This threshold likely would preclude medical moni-
163. In percentage terms, this would represent an increase from .03% to .07%.
164. Under any proportional liability system, however, preserving the plaintiff's options
should be an option rather than a requirement. Consequently, courts should not interpret
statutes of limitation as barring claims prior to manifestation if a plaintiff does not choose to file
suit until that time. See supra notes 64, 153, 159 and accompanying text.
165. For example, assume each cancer ease to be valued at one million dollars. When the
$1,000,000 is multiplied by the increased risk (.04%), the individual recovery would be only
$400. Such a case may be feasible, however, as a class action. See Rosenberg, Causal Connec-
tion, supra note 124, at 908-16.
166. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 69 (contrasting certitude of medical monitoring damages
with variability of damages for pain, fear, and anxiety).
167. See ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBH=YFORPERSONALINJURY, supra note 64, at 379-80 &
n.60 (stating that "it would be inappropriate for a court to order a defendant to fund [medical
monitoring] for all 100,000 people residing in the area of a toxic exposure where the exposure
is projected to increase the incidence of[a particular disease] from 3 to 5"); see also id. at 373-
74 (asserting that compensation for slight increases in risk - "on the order of 2 or 3 percent" -
should fall primarily "within the purview of state and federal environmental regulation");
Brennan, supra note 5, at 69 (advocating "significant potential for injury" prior to compensating
for medical monitoring); Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10, at 16-18 (presenting
formulations for compensation of medical monitoring based on level of increased risk). This
line could be drawn in any number of ways including, most obviously, an absolute numerical
cutoff in terms of enhanced risk percentage. Id. Professor Brennan provided a more creative
solution, suggesting that courts limit medical monitoring recovery to those exposed to "signifi-
cant concentrations of one of the... most toxic chemicals as designated by the [Agency for
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toring recovery to the citizens of Niceville in the hypothetical set forth above,
even though the door would remain open to them to sue for enhanced risk.
C. Tort Law Does Not Apply
The previous two sections have explained the limits of post-exposure,
pre-symptom tort recovery under the proposed standard. The following
section provides an example in which the tort system would not apply, despite
the existence of an increased risk of disease.168
Suppose for example that BigCo negligently has exposed the citizens of
Niceville to "chemex," and studies show that the level of exposure increased
their risk of contracting cancer from 25% to 30%.169 As in the previous
examples, assume that no plaintiff has manifested symptoms of disease and
that procedures exist that would make the early detection and treatment of the
cancer possible. Under the standard proposed here, the citizens of Niceville
could not use the tort system to obtain compensation for enhanced risk of
disease."' The "doctrinal" reason, of course, would be that the plaintiffs
could not establish that their risk of contracting disease had doubled.
Advocates of proportional liability would disagree with this result.
Instead, they would argue that each citizen of Niceville should receive a per-
centage ofthe cost of an eventual case of cancer.' The primary theory behind
this argument, of course, would be deterrence: the rule would force BigCo to
internalize the costs of the harm that we know they will cause in the future. 72
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)]." Brennan, supra note 5, at 69. As this
author previously has stated, "Professor Brennan's suggestion has the benefit of clarity and
rationality in that those who compile the ATSDR list are primarily concerned with the overall
risk posed by each substance." Klein, MedicalMonitoring, supra note 10, at 17.
168. By stating that the "tort system would not apply," this Article suggests that a plaintiff
could not maintain an action to recover for enhanced risk or medical monitoring. As noted
above, however, this Article takes no position on the possibility of emotional distress recovery
as a possible pre-manifestation tort law remedy. See supra note 155 and accompanying text
169. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988) (refusing
to permit enhanced risk recovery on evidence of 25%-30% increased risk). The Sterling court
based its ruling on the traditional rule - the plaintiffs could not show that disease was reason-
ably certain to follow. Id. The claim would fail under the standard proposed in this Article for
a different reason - the plaintiffs could not show that the exposure doubled their risk of disease.
Although the standards lead to the same conclusion under this set of facts, the rationales behind
the conclusions are much different.
170. Nor could the citizens of Niceville recover the costs of medical monitoring. See supra
notes 112, 157-60 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of proposed standard to
medical monitoring); see also Klein, Medical Monitoring, supra note 10, at 31-32 (asserting
that use of tort system is less logical when level of increase of risk is undefined).
171. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
ENHANCED RISK
Setting aside corrective justice objections,17 the proposal in this Article
rejects proportional liability here for more pragmatic reasons. First, permit-
ting enhanced recovery in this type of case would open the tort system to an
enormous number of claimants, likely to such an extent that administrative
concerns would preclude any realistic possibility of having courts adopt the
standard.174 Second, and more broadly, permitting proportional liability here
would create a troubling lack of consonance in the application of actual
causation. In particular, the proportional liability rule would have the contra-
dictory effect of imposing responsibility on the defendant for creating a risk
that the system would not impose if the disease actually manifested.175
The problem with rejecting liability in this type of case, however, is that
we know BigCo's conduct will cause harm in the future, yet BigCo is never
forced to internalize the harm's cost. The answer to this concern is to recog-
nize that it is impractical to expect tort law to provide the sole mechanism for
deterrence in our society. When the tort system cannot do so realistically or
efficiently, we should look elsewhere to achieve this goal. In the area of toxic
exposure and enhanced risk of disease, administrative alternatives, such as
taxes or compensation programs, could fill the void in ways that would solve
many of the problems of a vastly expanded tort system.'76
The use of administrative alternatives to tort law has been the subject of
vigorous debate.'77 Commentators such as Peter Huber, for example, have
173. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing number of individuals
exposed to potentially harmful toxins). Indeed, obtaining the desired level of deterrence would
entail attempting to bring as high a number of exposed individuals into the tort process as
possible. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text Thus, obtaining the maximum
benefit of a proportional liability approach in this type of case necessarily exacerbates the "flood
of litigation" problem. Cf. Rosenberg, Causal Connection, supra note 124, at 892 (stating that
fear of "flood of petty and spurious claims" from mass exposure is groundless because cost of
adjudicating claims, rather than number of claims, is appropriate concern).
175. For example, suppose one of Niceville's citizens contracted cancer and sued BigCo,
alleging that the exposure to chemex caused her disease. This claim would fail because the
citizen could not prove that the exposure more likely than not caused the disease. In fact, it is
far more likely that the exposure did do so. Of course, the claim could succeed if a court
applied the proposed doubling-of-the-risk standard, because doubling of the risk shows that any
manifestation would more likely than not be the result of the exposure. This connection to the
typical causation standard is also part of what makes the proposal more attuned to notions of
corrective justice as compared to a system of pure proportional liability. See supra notes 131-
35 and accompanying text
176. See Klein,MedicalMonitoring, supra note 10, at 33-37 (discussing how administrative
alternatives to tort law would work in medical monitoring context); see also Berger, supra note
97, at 1245 (describing possible responses to corporations' failures to disclose known dangers).
177. See generally ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBIUTY FOR PERSONAL I.NURY, supra note 64
(proposing administrative alternatives to tort law); Abraham, supra note 120 (same); Sugarman,
1207
56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1173 (1999)
argued that tort law is almost always an inferior mechanism to make public
risk assessment decisions. 7 ' Other scholars, such as Professors Clayton P.
Gillette and James E. Krier, vigorously disagreed and have criticized such
general conclusions as overly ambitious and "remarkably premature.1
179
Most ofthe debate, however, approaches the problem as an all-or-nothing
competition between agencies and courts. Such polarization leaves little room
for innovation, and even participants in the debate recognize its "no-win"
nature. 8 Professor E. Donald Elliott, for example, described himself as a
believer in the superiority of administrative agencies.' 8' Yet, he wrote about
the need for society "to develop new institutional arrangements that adapt the
best features of both courts and the administrative process to deal with the
problems of toxics in the environment."' 2
As this author has argued, it is most productive to begin developing such
"instit tional arrangements" within specific contexts." 3 In the enhanced risk
context, this requires limiting the tort system's role to situations where a
connection to causation can be made - that is, when the enhanced risk plaintiff
can prove a doubling of the risk.' 4 In other cases, society should look more
supra note 143 (same); Symposium, Future Prospects for Compensation Systems, 52 MD. L.
REV. 893 (1993) (same).
178. See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public RiskManage-
ment in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277,278 (1985) (criticizing judicial system's inability
to manage public risk); see also Donald E. Elliott, Why Courts?, supra note 78, at 803 (stating
that "there is... reason to believe that other institutions are better equipped than lay courts and
juries to assess risks").
179. Clayton P. Gillette& James E. Krier, Risk; Courts, andAgencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1027, 1031 (1990).
180. See Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts, supra note 51, at 783 (describing continuing
debate as "'no-win' choice between courts and compensation funds").
181. Seeid.at791.
182. Id. at 783. Professor Elliott advocated techniques that combine judicial and adminis-
trative elements into "hybrid compensations systems." He asserted that "[t]he idea is not to
replace judges and juries, but to facilitate their deliberations by using the administrative process
to develop scientific information that can be used in individual tort cases." Id.; see also id. at
798 ("In light of the real strengths and weaknesses that affect both traditional litigation and
traditional administrative compensation systems, I do not believe that either 'alternative' in its
pure form will constitute the future's answer to the problem of compensation for exposure to
toxic substances in the environment").
183. See Klein,Medical Monitoring, supra note 10, at 28 (stating that, in medical monitor-
ing context, "[a] tort regime that fails to apply a defined enhanced risk standard will provide
little check on litigation that is driven by factors unrelated to the actual risk of defendant's activ-
ity").
184. See supra notes 111-13, 127-30 and accompanying text. Professor Elliott is critical
of the role that causation often plays in toxic torts litigation. See Elliott, The Future of Toxic
Torts, supra note 51, at 784 (describing "effect of the traditional legal requirement that plaintiffs
must prove that they are more likely than not to have suffered physical injury in order to
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closely at administrative agencies as institutions that might intervene in the
name of public risk."'5 The precise details of how such systems might operate
are not the focus of this Article. 6 However, as this author has argued in
similar contexts, it is more than possible for administrative compensation and




Despite the efforts of courts and the suggestions of commentators, tort
law has done a poor job of handling enhanced risk cases. Doing better re-
quires some forward thinking, as well as a look to the past. In the forward
sense, tort law must move beyond awkward attempts to force enhanced risk
cases into existing paradigms. There is no good reason, for example, to
compensate for the possibility of future harm based on whether current
manifestations of disease exist."' Instead, a better line might be drawn by
recover" as "pernicious"). The proposal in this Article, however, would not require plaintiffs
to prove a current physical injury as a prerequisite to access the tort system for enhanced risk
recovery. Rather, the proposal would require evidence that, if an illness were to manifest, the
plaintiff could connect it to the defendant's conduct. The proposal also leaves the door open
for compensation unrelated to physical harm, such as recovery for emotional distress caused by
toxic exposure. In this way, the proposal contained in this Article is not necessarily inconsistent
with Professor Elliott's view that the "the affront to one's dignity that occurs when one is
assaulted with a potentially hazardous chemical, is also an injury that the law should recognize
and compensate." Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts, supra note 51, at 789.
185. This position does not intend to idealize administrative risk regulation, nor to ignore
arguments that "capture theory" creates motivations in political markets that are similar to those
in other markets. See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 179, at 1064-70. Instead, the position
simply suggests there is room for a sensible middle ground in the public risk debate that would
delineate circumstances under which both courts and agencies might operate to deter a proper
amount of risk.
186. For examples of literature that addresses this topic in detail, see Symposium, Future
Prospects for Compensation Systems, supra note 177. See also ENTERPRISE RESPONSIEHITY
FOR PERSONAL INURY, supra note 64, at 441-83; Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative
to "'No Cause" Liability in Blood Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. REG. 107, 111 (1995)
[hereinafter Klein, Legislative Alternative].
187. See Klein, Legislative Alternative, supra note 186, at 111-15 (proposing administra-
tive scheme for victims of iY-contaminated blood products); Klein, Medical Monitoring,
supra note 10, at 33 (proposing administrative remedy for plaintiffs who do not meet proposed
medical monitoring tort standard). Professor Berger also agreed that administrative compensa-
tion schemes should be a part of toxic tort reform: "Ideally, an administrative compensation
scheme should be a part of this model .... It should at least be mentioned that such a scheme
would start operating once a corporation was found negligent under the information gathering
standard." Berger, supra note 97, at 2145; see supra note 126 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Professor Bergir's theory).
188. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
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looking to the past and borrowing from a rule nearly as old as "he who breaks
must pay."'89 That, of course, is the traditional rule of actual causation that
requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct more likely than not
caused his harm."9
This Article has argued that tort law should provide plaintiffs with
enhanced risk compensation only when they can prove that toxic exposure has
doubled their risk of disease. 9' If plaintiffs can do so, the Article recom-
mends that the tort system provide them with proportional compensation
based on their level of increased risk. This proposal borrows from a full range
of tort law concerns. First, by relying on the traditional rule of actual causa-
tion, the proposal considers corrective justice." Second, by advocating
proportional liability, the proposal takes account of the tort law goal of
deterrence. 93 Finally, by limiting the number of potential enhanced risk
plaintiffs, the proposal actually may be feasible administratively. 94
In the end, we must recognize that the enhanced risk problem will be part
of the tort landscape for years to come. The sooner we develop a meaningfil
way to handle such cases, the better off the tort system will be.
189. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 85,112-13, 118 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 111-13, 117-30 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 62-65, 136-41 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
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